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Reputation Lasts Longer Than Life: How can Central Banks Quantify their Reputational Risk?

Abstract: It takes multiple decades of commitment and credibility to create reputation but only a few seconds to tarnish it, as the instances of misinformation, disinformation and malinformation galore. In light of this, Central banks, as delicate and sensitive public institutions, are significantly vulnerable to such reputation risk due to their mandate for policy decisions and implementation. Thus, this study aims to formulate a barometer that quantifies the reputation score of central banks. The Central Bank Reputation (CBR) score is derived based on the respondents' responses to a questionnaire that includes twelve attributes and twenty-eight indicators, which is administered among the eight set of audiences. The reputation score ranges from -100 to +100, that indicates the reputation of the Central Bank at a point of time. The deviation in reputation score between two points of time thus measures the reputational risk. However, the study suggests applying other qualitative analysis tools in complement with this quantitative barometer, to come up with the robust assessment.

Keywords: Credibility, Risk Management, Reputational Risk, Reputational Barometer.

JEL Classification: E5, E52, E58

1. Introduction

Central banks were often considered to be risk averse, but not always risk aware. But after the 2007-09 global financial crisis, central banks are placed in compulsion to adhere to robust risk management frameworks in the fi-

financial institutions that they supervise and inspect. Also, they have begun to re-examine their own risk management frameworks, view risk in a similar way to private companies, and anticipate risks in a holistic way.

In most parts of the world, central banks have been given wider mandates and greater policy roles since the crisis. Further, central banks are also found to regulate financial institution and engage in macroprudential regulations. The nature of these mandates is such that they impose asymmetric reputational risk to central banks. For instance, several years of successful supervision by central banks go unnoticed, but one single failure in supervision often has profound and far-reaching ramifications. In the blink of an eye, institutional reputations may get dusted, being a victim of information asymmetries such as misinformation, disinformation and malinformation. Amidst this asymmetry, managing the risks associated with reputation has become important for central banks due to increasing complexity in the twenty-first century.

Defining “reputational risk”

Basically, a reputational risk is the probability of damage to the standings or credibility of an institution or organization in the eyes of its stakeholders. However, reputational risk is one of the most elusive categories of risk due to the difficulty in measurement and unclear understanding of the fundamentals that generate it. The Bank for International Settlement (2019) holistically defines reputational risk as follows:

“Reputational risk can be defined as the risk arising from negative perception on the part of customers, counterparties, shareholders, investors, debt-holders, market analysts, other relevant parties or regulators that can adversely affect a bank’s ability to maintain existing, or establish new, business relationships and continued access to sources of funding.”

In a similar fashion, the Board of Governors of the Federal reserve system (2004) defined reputational risk as:

“Reputational risk is the potential that negative publicity regarding an institution’s business practices, whether true or not, will cause a decline in the customer base, costly litigation, or revenue reductions.”

The Nepal Rastra Bank (2015), the central bank of Nepal, has defined reputational risk more vividly and reflects that all other risks that encircle a central bank are ultimately hampering their reputation at large.

“Reputation risk refers to the possibility that the Bank’s public image would be jeopardized and unable in achieving policy objectives and fulfillment of its responsibilities toward the public, employees, stakeholders and the entire economy. Reputation risk becomes more acute when the Bank is unable to manage all other risks proactively and systematically.”

Why does it matter for the Central Bank?

Most central banks are mandated with the goal of price and economic stability and financial sector stability, with some exceptions such as the Fed having an additional goal of maintaining the employment level. They achieve these goals via extensive use of policy measures. And the effectiveness of the policies is largely determined by the trust of the public in the system and Central Banks communication. If the public does not find their central bank to be credible enough, the policy measures cannot produce a desirable effect on the economy.

During the times of financial stress and its aftermath, central banks over the globe call upon appropriate policy measures to restore economic and financial stability, which ultimately is aimed at resumption of growth. During this period, a good and strong credibility of the central bank obviously improves policy effectiveness, because the public will then follow the path that the central bank dictates. For example, in an inflation-targeting regime, if citizens believe that central banks monetary policy will be effective in keeping inflation low and stable, they will adjust their expectations and behave accordingly, reinforcing the achievement of the inflation target (Vardy, 2015).

Also, credibility plays a vital role in protecting the currency from counterfeits and speculative runs. The financial system runs with a level of confidence because the central bank is perceived as an unbiased assessor of risks, provider of liquidity and the lender of the last resort. Central banks, throughout history, have helped the smooth functioning of the financial system during periods of crisis and halted the spread into more disruptions in the market. So, any policies that shocks market participants or stakeholders is likely to be criticized and it drains the reputational capital over time.

In the light of this, central banks need to give urgent attention towards effectively assessing and handling the reputational risks. There are many tools employed by central banks for managing the financial risks and they are also quantified in numbers. But, reputational risk, by its nature and definition, is a bit vague and demands prudent care for assessment and measurement. Thus, this study proposes a reputation barometer that is suitable in the case of central banks.

2. Literature Review

It is well evident that a strong reputation is a vital ingredient for exercising effective regulatory power. Fundamentally, a good reputation shapes the power of government organization, and more broadly, the powers of the state (Carpenter, 2010). Central bank, thus being a government institution with bureaucratic behaviour, has a huge relevance of reputation. But, there has always been difficulty in measurement of reputation construct. The complex nature of reputation is optimally illustrated by Carpenter, drawing upon historical narrative and statistical analysis. The researcher employs numerous data sources that include archives, interviews, scientific magazines and such. However, a question of how to translate these findings into reputational prediction looms large, as different organizations run on different contexts.

Private sectors are more proactive in this run of reputational assessment and have formulated reputational scales validated in different organizational and geographical locations, but they tend to be too narrowly focused for use in public institutions. Because the private sector's reputation signals competitive advantage and profit only but the public sector cares about more factors. (Wæraas & Byrkjeflot, 2012; Hall, 1993). Saying so, central banks like private counterparts need to demonstrate uniqueness and value addition over other public institutions to secure stakeholder support, employee loyalty and public confidence. Yet, this competition cannot only be gauged by only performance considerations but by other dimensions as well (Groenleer, 2011).


In the public sector, some important milestones have been crossed through the research progressions by researchers such as Lee and Van Ryzin (2019). They have employed feedback from experts and surveyed over 300 US citizens, and developed a unidimensional scale of bureaucratic reputation, representing domains of performance, morality, procedural fairness, technical competence, and general reputation. Similarly, Overman, Busuioc & Wood (2020) built, tested and cross-validated a survey instrument through two surveys of 2,100 key stakeholders of the European Chemicals Agency, the EU regulatory agency responsible for implementing and administering chemicals legislation. This scale represents an important contribution to reputation literature, and purports that direct stakeholder contact with the agency is necessary for stakeholders to be able to evaluate the reputation independently.

A study was performed in Brazilian banks to assess the reputational risk using a simple model that integrates random effects and Logit models. Price and news are considered as determinants of the risk. This paper measured reputational risk

by evaluating the bank's stock price reaction to bad news about the bank. The study compared the variance of reputational risk in a bank to the variance of reputational risk of the Brazilian banking system (Araújo & Vinhado, 2016). This method only considered the financial aspect of the bank that is share price and estimated its variance as proxy to reputational impact. However, this is questionable in the case of central banks, which have an obligation towards the system and must work to generate public confidence, in addition to their financial dealings.

Araújo and Vinhado (2016) mentions that reputational risk is probably the hardest one to measure, unlike other risks. For instance, market risks are tractable with proper time-series, volatility metrics and techniques such as VaR. But, reputational risk is a difficult one as it is related to all other risks. The researchers illustrated the risk relationship in the following ways:

Figure 1: Degree of measurability of banks risks¹



The figure also shows that the reputational risk of the central bank depends upon the management of all other risks.

¹ The structure has been retrieved from a model presented by Araújo & Vinhado (2016).

Central bankers are often accused not to serve the people but their own interests and certain groups, thus violating rule of being preserved from capture. Further, they posit, as the central banks are custodian of structural power on economies and societies, they shall map out a new framework of social responsibility as well (Vallet, 2021). Further, communication is also a factor that may cause risk of reputation for central bank. But, it is difficult to define an optimal method and level of communication (Lethimaki & Palmu, 2022). Also, financial technology innovations are bringing with them various benefits and opportunities, and they also have weaknesses and pose potential threats to financial systems. The paper by Vučinić & Luburić (2022) examines and outlines their potential benefits and associated risks. All in all, reputational risk is ultimately impacted with triggering of all the risk events.

To date, there have been no studies aiming to gauge the level of reputational risk of central banks. The major reason behind this is the unavailability of the models for computation of the reputational risk. Though the private sector, including cement factories and other FMCG industries, conduct minimal brand audits to assess reputation, this concept has not penetrated public institutions. This study aims to fulfill this lacuna, while also suggesting a model for calculation of reputational risk for central banks. These models can also be tailored to any other organization based on environment and context. The study, thus, aims to fulfill this lacuna.

3. Conceptual Framework

This study is majorly based on the concept of ‘agency reputation’. As per Carpenter (2010), agency reputation refers to ‘a set of symbolic beliefs about the unique or separable capacities, roles and obligations of an organization, where these beliefs are embedded in audience networks.’ This definition is amalgamated with Dowling and Gardberg (2012) concept of corporate reputation to frame out this model of reputation barometer. The framework of this reputation barometer tool is structured around the three elements: Attributes, Indicators, and Audiences. Firstly, the attributes of the construct ‘reputation’ are framed from the primary objectives of central banks. For each attribute, three or four indicators of reputation attributes are derived. And these attributes are scored by different groups of audiences. The audiences are stakeholders who are directly linked with central banks.

Attributes: Central Bank reputation is made up of stakeholders’ perception on ‘unique capacities, roles and obligations’ of central banks. The review of several

central banks objectives and functions, aided by available literatures and real-world practice, has identified a set of distinct attributes of central banks².

Table 1: Attributes and Indicators of Central Bank Reputation

Attributes	Indicators
<p>i. Macroeconomic Stability: Central banks need to ensure that appropriate policies on Inflation control, Interest Rate stability, are adopted.</p>	<p>1. Formulating and implementing necessary Monetary policy 2. Ensuring the sufficient availability of Credit (Money Supply) 3. The ability to regulate inflation (low and stable inflation)</p>
<p>ii. Issuance of Banknotes and Coins: Central banks have the sole authority to issue and manage the legal tender.</p>	<p>4. Issuing Banknotes and Coins 5. Ensuring adequate currency availability for transactions 6. Maintaining the trust of public in the currency (legal tender)</p>
<p>iii. Foreign Currency Management: Maintaining the foreign exchange rate, handling the reserves of the country, and dealing with external payments are under purview of central banks.</p>	<p>7. Ensuring sufficient foreign currency reserves 8. Easing the exchange of foreign currencies 9. Determining foreign currency exchange rates</p>
<p>iv. Economic Research and Publications: For discharging effective monetary policy and ensuring financial stability, central banks over the globe have mandate of research and publishing the economic updates</p>	<p>10. Conducting Economic Research activities 11. Record and publish sufficient economic Statistics 12. Publication of Economic Research/Journals/Articles</p>
<p>v. Regulation and Supervision of Banking and Financial System: As a guardian and lender of the last resort for BFI's, Central banks undertake prudential measures to ensure smooth functioning of the financial system.</p>	<p>13. Efficient Regulation and Supervision of BFI's. 14. Handling of Private information and Confidentiality issues 15. Ensuring the adoption of state-of-the-art international practices in Banking system</p>
<p>vi. Human resource Management: Central banks need to pool experts from diverse fields ranging from human resource management to economic policy making. Also, keeping them motivated intrinsically and extrinsically is a must.</p>	<p>16. Fairness in Recruitment/Transfer of Human Resource 17. Employing Scientific Performance Evaluation System 18. Sufficient Training and Career Development Programs to Staffs</p>

² The objectives and functions of the Federal Reserve, Reserve Bank of India, Nepal Rastra Bank, and Bank of England have been benchmarked to derive the attributes for this study.

vii. Coordination with Int'l agencies: central banks are in constant touch with international agencies such as IMF, WB, APG, etc. for policy support.	19. Co-operation and Co-ordination with International Agencies 20. Technical Assistance and Knowledge Sharing Activities 21. Active participation in Conference/ Seminars/ Workshops
viii. Transparency: Being an independent body, central banks need to maintain a high degree of transparency as a democratic institution.	22. The accessibility of communication materials on website 23. The handling of requests for public access to documents/ reports/ statistics.
ix. Independence: The policies formulated by central banks may not be in unison with government policy, particularly at hard times.	24. NRB's independence from Governmental entities 25. NRB's independence from Intl agencies (in policy making)
x. Innovativeness: As the economic environment is dynamic and complex, central banks need to constantly innovate products to avoid emerging risks.	26. NRB's Innovativeness (in products, research, initiations)
xi. Managing Emerging Risks: Risks need to be better managed, to avoid crises.	27. Proactiveness in managing Emerging Risks (Internal and External)
xii. Communication with Stakeholders: Frequent and precise communication is required to maintain credibility and sustain the reputation.	28. Communication with Stakeholders (use of different sorts of media)

Indicators: Twelve attributes have been further disaggregated into 28 indicators as detailed in table 1. The attributes and indicators are included in the questionnaire used to collect the stakeholder perception. Here, attributes are concepts whereas indicators are constructs that help to define attributes with more precision and specificity.

Central banks over the globe perform different sets of functions, so there is no such universal set of tasks. It rather depends upon the history, situation, independence, and other factors. The number of indicators and attributes could be adjusted by central banks, based on their mandate and obligations.

Audiences: Each central bank's reputation is determined via quantity and quality of audience network. Carpenter (2010) has rightly emphasized the importance of audience by suggesting- "look at the audience and look at the threats." Central banks often have a multitude of audiences based upon the mandate to them. Majorly, it is engaged in macroeconomic policy making, having issues such as inflation, growth, and unemployment that impact day-to-day operations of people from diverse walks of life. Central banks are engaged in scientific work and

research on different economic issues. Further, it is a risk manager of the banking and financial system. In general, the audience of central bank is varied as it gets engaged in various dimensions of tasks. Central bank audiences and their relationship with central banks are presented in table 2.:

Table 2: Categories of audiences and their relationship with Central Banks

Audiences	Relationship with Central Banks
General Public	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Economic Policy making • Currency and Notes availability • Foreign Exchange
Bank and Financial Institutions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Supervision and Regulation • Licensing of BFI's • Banker of the Banks / Lender of Last Resort
Government Agencies	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Issuance of Government Bonds/Debts • Monetary and Fiscal policy coordination • Economic Advisory
Universities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Research and Publications • Statistical Records
Central Bank Staffs	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Principal Agent Relationship
Media Houses	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • News Publication • Public Awareness / Financial Literacy
Non-Profit Organizations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Policy aid in Economic Development • Financial Inclusion Issues
Other Private Businesses	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Interest Rate / Money Supply Determination • Imports / Exports Policies • Foreign Currency Transactions / Letter of Credits

The various relationships that these audiences have with the Central Banks may translate into different expectations and views on central bank performance. One set of audience may consider the same feature of central banks work as burdensome while others will find it insufficient. And, though rating may be the same on the performance scale, justifications may be diverse. These differences would be accommodated by the introduction of questions tailored for specific groups to ensure that they might comment specifically on matters that concern them the most. This study assumes that each audience is relatively homogeneous.

Temporality:

In this study, the construct ‘Central Bank Reputation’ is anchored in a contemporary time frame. This barometer tool has been designed to focus on CB reputation at the time period of the survey. That is, it is neither backward looking nor forward looking. However, this barometer can compare the central bank reputation over time, from one year to the next.

4. Research Methodology

Survey Questionnaire: The tool uses Survey Questionnaire (see Appendix 1) to gauge the perception of different categories of audiences. The aim of quantifying the reputation risk is better served if perception of each sort of audience is recorded via questionnaire. The Questionnaire is developed with the list of attributes and indicators as mentioned in Table 1. The Sample size of the survey should be based on the number of categories of audience. From each category audience, at least 30 samples should be collected, to come up with an acceptable degree of reliability. As long as the resources are available enough, the sample size can be increased. Increment in the sample size would further increase the precision in the score.

Attributes, Indicators and Audiences: The list of attributes, indicators and audiences provided is not explicit, and thus, certain amendments could be done by respective central banks as per their mandate and working area. For instance, the Fed is assigned to work on the reduction in unemployment as one of their goals, unlike any other central banks, so, for them, this attribute could be added upon. Similarly, the Bank of England does not perform the supervision of banks and financial institutions, while the Central Bank of Nepal itself conducts the regulation and supervision of banks and financial institutions. This shows that central bank mandates vary. Therefore, the attributes, indicators and audiences in the questionnaire could be added or deleted based on this stand.

Weighting of Attributes: As depicted in the Questionnaire specified in Appendix 1, the survey tool includes a question assessing the importance that respondents give to each attribute. The rationale behind this weightage is that different audiences have different nature of relationship with the central bank and thus, there is a difference in perception and expectations from the central bank. For instance, directives and circulars that are issued by the central bank are of more concern to Banks and Financial Institutions (BFIs), but less to 'Not for Profit organizations. To make sure this issue is resolved, a question is mentioned in the questionnaire (Question No. 4) that rates each attribute based on the importance given.

"Please rate the following aspects of the Central Bank's functions in terms of how important they are to you. Where you are not familiar with CB's work and feel you cannot assess the item, please select "Not Applicable".

Attributes of Reputation/Response	Not Important (1)	Low Importance (2)	Slightly Important (3)	Moderately important (4)	Very Important (5)	Extremely Important (6)	Not Applicable (0)
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Respondents are asked to indicate what importance each attribute had to themselves, on a six-point scale from ‘Non-Important’ to ‘Extremely Important’. Later, respondents are asked to rate NRB’s functions (indicators of reputation) on a scale of 1 to 6 and O, if not applicable.

“Please rate the Central Bank’s work on each of the following aspects, based on your impression. Where you are not familiar with CB’s work and feel you cannot assess the item, please select “Not Applicable”.

Indicators of Reputation/Response	Extremely Poor (1)	Very Poor (2)	Poor (3)	Acceptable (4)	Good (5)	Very Good (6)	Not Applicable (0)
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Reputation Score Calculation:

The reputation score of the Central Bank can be calculated as the sum of the weighted score given to each attribute of the Central Bank’s reputation. In mathematical terms,

$$CBR = \sum_{I=1}^N R W_I \cdot P_I$$

$$CBR = RW_1 \cdot P_1 + RW_2 \cdot P_2 + \dots + RW_N \cdot P_N$$

where,

CBR = Central Bank Reputation Score.

I = An attribute of Central Bank Reputation.

RW = The relative weight given to each attribute.

P_I = Performance Score given by respondent to that attribute

Relative Weight (RW) Computation:

The relative weighting given to each attribute is calculated from a set of important scores, WI, where each score represents an answer to the question “How important is the attribute to you?”. For instance, a respondent may consider Transparency to be of moderate importance (W=4 on a scale from 1 to 6).

In order to determine the relative weight that an attribute should have in the overall reputation score, W is turned into RW, by using following equation:

$$RW_I = \frac{W_I}{\sum_{I=1}^N W_I}$$

For example, If a respondent has given a weight of 4 to attribute 1 ($W_1 = 4$), weight of 3 to attribute 2 ($W_2 = 3$) and weight of 2 to attribute 3 ($W_3 = 2$), then the relative weight of attribute is calculated as

$$RW_I = \frac{4}{4+3+2} = 0.444 \text{ (44.4\%)}$$

Performance Score (P) Computation:

Performance score ranges on a scale from -100 (extremely poor) to +100 (extremely good). The ratings submitted by a respondent on each indicator are corresponded with scores, as illustrated below. And average score of indicators is taken to come up with a score for attributes.

Indicators of Reputation/Response	Extremely Poor (1)	Very Poor (2)	Poor (3)	Not Applicable (0)	Acceptable (4)	Good (5)	Very Good (6)
Score	-100	-66	-33	0	33	66	100

For example, we have the attribute 'Issuance of Bank Notes and Coins' with three indicators- Note Issuance, Currency Availability and Public Trust. Say, scores for these three indicators are 0,66 and 100 respectively, then the overall performance score for the attribute 'Issuance of Bank Notes and Coins' is:

$$P = \frac{0 + 66 + 100}{3} = 55 \text{ (approx.)}$$

5. Interpretation of the findings

The Central Bank Reputation Score can range from -100 to +100. The score of -100 is the worst score possible whereas +100 represents that the stakeholders perceive the central bank as an absolutely credible, reliable and stalwart organization. Similarly, the score ranging from -20 to +20 is considered as a neutral reputation. Each central bank should strive to move towards the zone at right-most side via necessary actions.

Negative				Neutral			Positive			
-100	-80	-60	-40	-20	0	20	40	60	80	100

While obtaining the reputation score of a central bank, it is advisable to calculate separate reputation scores for different sets of audiences. One set of audience may be naturally or by nature of their functions biased, (for example, governmental agencies are often critical in assessing central banks due to fiscal policy and monetary policy tussle) with the functioning of central banks, and thus make the overall score low, which can lower the average score from other audiences.

A hypothetical scenario is formulated below to clarify the concept:

General Public	Banks and Financial Institutions	Government Agencies	Universities	Central Bank Staffs	Media Houses	Not for Profits	Other Private Businesses
-75	-50	-18	0	25	50	70	85

The reputation scores, thus obtained through this tool, is helpful in determining the lacunas in specific paradigms of central bank’s functions. This tool majorly assesses the perception that the stakeholders have towards the central banks of the respective country. Obviously, different stakeholders perceive central banks differently. And this tool would help central banks to prioritize the area for immediate actions.

For computation of the reputational risk, the difference in the Central Bank Reputation (CBR) score over two points of time should be calculated. Either there would be increase or decrease in reputational risk. Say,

$$CBR_1 = \text{Central Bank Reputation Score in Year 1}$$

$$CBR_2 = \text{Central Bank Reputation Score in Year 2}$$

Here, if $CBR_1 > CBR_2$, reputational risk is considered to have increased and if $CBR_1 < CBR_2$, reputational risk is considered to have decreased. Central Banks, based on their own judgement, can define the level of difference that will trigger risk mitigating measures.

One of the major aims of this tool is to enable the Central Banks to track their reputation score over time. This would help them formulate actions and evaluate their effectiveness too. Despite the reputation risk being borne to the central banks due to uncertainty of external factors, proactive actions are expected.

Though this study talks about conducting only questionnaire surveys among the stakeholders, the author also accepts that there will be no perfect metric for gauging the reputational outcomes. On the same page, Steinhoff and Sprengel (2014) have purported the use of qualitative and expert-based approaches since many reputational risks cannot be expressed in numbers. However, this tool would be an additional tool to the available qualitative and expert-based approaches.

So, central banks are suggested to perform in-depth interviews with a few of the experts from each category of audience to corroborate the generated insights and identify other issues that are missed through this tool. Furthermore, social media analysis would help central banks to be better informed about the buzz within netizens. Textual analysis could also be performed to determine the public sentiment towards central bank.

7. Conclusion

In a nutshell, the policy impact to be exerted by central banks, as a country's monetary authority, are heavily reliant upon the level of trust that citizens bear towards the central bank. For this, quantifying public perception via reputation score enables central banks to act more effectively and delve upon the stakeholders' perceptions with precision. Not only central banks, but also other public entities and private businesses can use this tool with a certain tweak to gauge the status of their reputation in the market. As it takes decades to create a reputation, a single (mis/mal/dis) information can tarnish the reputation within seconds, so, it is a high time that entities took care of their reputation in a more quantitative and systematic way.

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Appendix

Appendix 1: Reputation Barometer Questionnaire

REPUTATION BAROMETER QUESTIONNAIRE

1. I engage with Central Bank or follow its activities:

- On a regular Basis (at least once a month)
- On a somewhat regular Basis (at least once a quarter)
- Rarely (annually)
- Never

2. With reference to the Central Bank's work, I would consider myself to be

- Very Familiar
- Quite Familiar
- Somewhat Familiar
- Not Familiar

3. I belong to:

- Central Bank Staffs (Banks and Financial Institutions)
- Journalists (Media Personals)
- Government Employees
- Members of Agencies (Non-Governmental)
- Academicians (Universities)
- Students (Public)

4. Please rate the following aspects of the Central Bank's functions in terms of how important they are to you. Where you are not familiar with CB's work and feel you cannot assess the item, please select "Not Applicable".

Attributes of Reputation/ Response	Not Important (1)	Low Importance (2)	Slightly Important (3)	Moderately important (4)	Very Important (5)	Extremely Important (6)	Not Applicable 0
Macroeconomic Stability							
Issuance of Bank Notes and Coins							
Foreign Currency Management							
Economic Research and Publications							
Regulation and Supervision of Banking and Financial System							
Human resource Management							
Co-operation and Co-ordination with Int'l agencies							
Transparency							
Independence							
Innovativeness							
Managing Emerging Risks							
Communication							

5. Please rate the Central Bank's work on each of the following aspects, based on your impression. Where you are not familiar with CB's work and feel you cannot assess the item, please select "Not Applicable".

Indicators of Reputation/ Response	Extremely Poor 1	Very Poor 2	Poor 3	Acceptable 4	Good 5	Very Good 6	Not Applicable 0
1. Formulating and implementing necessary Monetary policy							
2. Ensuring the sufficient availability of Credit (Money Supply)							
3. The ability to regulate inflation (low and stable inflation)							
4. Issuance of Bank Notes and Coins							
5. Ensuring adequate currency availability for transactions							
6. Maintaining the trust of public in the currency (legal tender)							
7. Ensuring sufficient foreign currency reserves							
8. Easing the exchange of foreign currencies							
9. Determining foreign currency exchange rates							
10. Conducting Economic Research activities (Inflation, GDP calculation, etc.)							
11. Record and Publish sufficient economic Statistics							
12. Publication of Economic Research/ Journals/Articles							
13. Efficient Regulation and Supervision of BFI's.							
14. Handling of Private information and Confidentiality issues							
15. Ensuring the adoption of state-of-the-art international practices in Banking system							
16. Fairness in Recruitment of Human Resource							
17. Employing Scientific Performance Evaluation System within CB							
18. Sufficient Training and Career Development Programs to Staffs							
19. Co-operation and Co-ordination with International Agencies							

20. Technical Assistance and Knowledge

Sharing Activities

21. Active participation in Conference/

Seminars/ Workshops

22. The accessibility of communication
materials on CB's website

23. The handling of requests for public
access to CB's documents/ reports/
statistics.

24. CB's independence from
Governmental entities

25. CB's independence from Int'l
agencies (in policy making)

26. CB's Innovativeness (in products,
research, initiations)

27. Managing Emerging Risks

28. Communication with Stakeholders
(use of different sorts of media)
